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Abstract
The paper presents a simple model of banking behavior where portfolio, liquid-
ity, and liability management determine simultaneously the demand and supply of
borrowed reserves on the interbank market. As the central bank is one player in
this market due to its reﬁnancing policy, it is able to determine the interest rate and
henceforth the residual demand for central bank loans. Comparative static analysis
shows how external or monetary policy shocks aﬀect the behavior on the interbank
market, the volume as well as the structure of the bank’s balance sheet. It turns out
that the banking ﬁrm behavior is non-linear and partially non-monotonous, indicat-
ing that the transmission of monetary measures is more complex when endogeneous
banking behavior is taken into account.
Keywords: banking ﬁrm, balance sheet, interbank market, borrowed reserves,
central banking, liquidity, transmission
JEL Classiﬁcation: E43, E58, G21
1 Introduction
The lending facilities on the market for reserves are one of the most important operating
targets of monetary policy. The interbank (money) market is therefore an important
hinge between central bank policy and the real sector, and the behavior of banks on
these markets is crucial for understanding the transmission process of monetary impulses.
The microeconomic literature about banking ﬁrm behavior is well developed and should
1markus.pasche@uni-jena.de. I thank Co-Pierre Georg, Sebastian Sienknecht, Jenny Poschmann
and Severin Weingarten for helpful comments.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 070not be reviewed again (see e.g. Santomero (1984), van Damme (1994), Swank (1996),
Freixas and Rochet (1997)). However, in most macroeconomic models the behavior of
banks on credit markets, asset markets and the market for borrowed reserves is often
unsatisfactorily modelled, or even missing. This holds true especially for the interbank
market because interbank relations seem to play no role in an aggregated macroeconomic
view of the banking sector. The recent literature on interbank market models is therefore
primarily basd on multi-agent simulation studies (cf. Georg and Poschmann (2010)).
In a standard Arrow/Debreu world there are neither informational frictions nor transac-
tion costs and hence no need for any ﬁnancial intermediaries. In Keynesian macroeco-
nomics, credit, money, and the behavior of agents in money markets under fundamental
uncertainty play an important role. However, in the neoclassical synthesis – the Keyne-
sian textbook model – bank behavior plays no role anymore, and the ﬁnancial sector is
reduced to a static LM curve. Also, many modern New Keynesian macroeconomic models
assume that the central bank directly determines “the” interest rate without considering
the conduct of monetary policy to a limited pass-through caused by ﬁnancial markets (for
an overview cf. Woodford (2003), Walsh (2003)). But drawing back to Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and the related literature on information asymmetries and rationing eﬀects in ﬁ-
nancial markets, several macro models aim to cope with this issue (overview in Dimsdale
(1994), Stiglitz (2003)). Their main focus is to analyse the implication of this market
imperfection for credit ﬁnanced investments in the real sector. They are of limited use,
however, for the analysis of interbank markets.
Models which are not related to information asymmetries diﬀer in their assumption on
whether the bank is a price taker or whether it sets the loans interest rates in a mo-
nopolistic competitive credit market, motivated either by regional aspects, or by product
diﬀerentiation. They also diﬀer in the assumption about bank’s risk attitude as well as
about its decision tasks: setting optimal interest rates, determining an optimal asset port-
folio, determining optimal reserve endowment to face unexpected liquiditiy outﬂows, etc.
In the following, we brieﬂy summarize some contributions in this ﬁeld:
van Loo (1980) presents a risk neutral bank which maximizes proﬁts by setting all interest
rates for loans and deposits due to a static monopolistic Cournot calculus. Additional
goals like soundness are then added as a constraint to the utility function. The interdepen-
dencies of setting the deposit interest rate on the liability side and the loans interest rate
on the asset side are analysed. There are neither portfolio considerations nor activities
determining the scale of the balance sheet or determining the reserve management.
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taker by scaling its balance sheet with borrowed reserves. The demand for borrowed
reserves is determined by the equilibrium interest rate on the credit market as well as
by the reﬁnancing cost at the central bank. There are neither portfolio considerations
nor do liquidity or soundness goals play any role. Since there is one representative bank,
there is of course no interbank market. In Bernanke and Blinder (1988), bank behavior
is described by a portfolio calculus, where loans and bonds are risky assets, while excess
reserves are the riskless part of the portfolio. Banks are risk averse and act as price takers.
The scale of the bank’s portfolio is determined by central bank’s reserve decisions. They
study the impact of bank behavior on the endogenous money multiplier. There are no
liquidity considerations and no interbank lending.
The model of Nautz (1998), based on Baltensperger (1980), focuses on the reserve man-
agement by including the cost of reﬁnancing expected outﬂows in terms of penalty facility
rates, e.g. marginal lending facilities of the central bank. He introduces uncertainty about
the future marginal lending facilities in a 2-period model and shows that announcements
of the central bank aﬀect bank’s behavior by inﬂuencing the degree of uncertainty. In
Ag´ enor and El Aynaoui (2010), banks set interest rates for loans and deposits according
to markup rules reﬂecting their risk attitude. There is no portfolio calculus on the asset
side, but an active dynamic reserve management motivated by the avoidance of liquidity
shortings due to deposit withdrawls, or the avoidance of costly liquidity borrowing as in
the model of Nautz (1998). Borrowing from the central bank is a residual in this model
since all other items in the balance sheet are endogenously determined. A similar ap-
proach can be found in Totzek (2009). In the model of H¨ ulsewig et al. (2009), banks act
on monopolistic competitive markets, setting loans interest rate optimally according to
Calvo’s staggered pricing approach. There is no liability management, no risk manage-
ment, no liquidity management, no activities on asset or bonds markets, and reserves are
exogeneously given. The outcome is that the central bank’s intereset rate setting results
in dampened movements of the aggregate loan interest rate.
Also in Post Keynesian macroeconomics, several approaches can be found to include
microfoundations of the banking ﬁrm in order to explain typical Keynesian features of
the ﬁnancial system like the interdependency of liquidity provision and credit creation.
In the model of Dymski (1988), banks are risk-neutral and maximize proﬁts by setting
interest rates and choosing the volume of borrowed funds to reﬁnance their activities.
Since loans have a longer maturity than other assets and liabilities and since deposits
3
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when (eventually unperceived) changes have taken place. This intertemporal relationship
is neccessary to show that decisions regarding the liability side and the credit supply side
are interdependent. To some extent this approach is close to the model presented in this
paper. Our model, however, exhibits strong interdependencies between diﬀerent bank
management tasks also in the static “timeless” version.
Further overviews about banking behavior which could be cosidered for macroeconomic
theoretical foundations can be found in Santomero (1984), van Damme (1994), Freixas
and Rochet (1997), and Swank (1996). The present paper contributes to this literature by
combining several aspects which drive the utility of the bank, and deriving its behavior
regarding optimal portfolio decisions, optimal scaling of the balance sheet by demanding
ﬁnancial sources, and optimal reserve management to face deposit volatility. Therefore,
it provides a rationale for the behavior on the credit market and on the market for other
risky assets as well as on the interbank market for borrowed reserves which is strongly
inﬂuenced by central bank policy measures. While the behavior on credit and other asset
markets has been studied in Georg and Pasche (2008), the focus of the present paper is on
the market for borrowed reserves. The recent ﬁnancial crisis emphasized the importance
of interbank loans which play an important role on both, the asset and the liability side
of the bank’s balance sheet. As an important feature of the crisis, we observed a sharp
reduction in interbank lending and a drastic increase in holding excess reserves (cf. Keiser
and McAndrews (2009), von Hagen (2009)).
The interconnection of banks via loans is also addressed in the literature on ﬁnancial
contagion (see Georg and Poschmann (2010)). Hence, a microfoundation of the supply
and demand behavior on the market for borrowed reserves may also contribute to the
contagion literature. To keep the analysis simple, we conﬁne to a static approach with
perfectly competitive markets and we neglect the problem of information asymmetries.
In the following, we ﬁrst describe the main management tasks on the asset and the liabil-
ity side, emphasizing their interdependency (chapter 2). We then set up a model where
decisions about asset structure, reﬁnancing operations and reserve management are con-
sistently derived by a calculus (chapter 3). It turns out, that the resulting behavioral
functions exhibit some nonlinearities and partially non-monotonies which require a nu-
merical analysis. Finally, we analyse the impact of diﬀerent kinds of exogenous shocks as
well as of monetary policy measures on the behavioral functions in a comparative-static
way (chapter 4). Chapter 5 concludes.
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It is too simple to represent the banking ﬁrm behavior with a proﬁt maximization problem.
The utility function of a (risk averse) banking ﬁrm should consist of diﬀerent components
like risk, return, soundness, and illiquidity avoidance, which reﬂect diﬀerent management
tasks. In our model, these tasks are represented as follows :
• Balancing risk and return: The optimal structure of the asset side of the bank’s
balance sheet is determined by a portfolio calculus according to a given degree of risk
aversion. By adopting the portfolio approach, we have the problem that expected
returns and risk are taken as given. However, depending on product diﬀerentiation
and specializing on monitoring or screening technologies, banks may charge diﬀerent
interest rates for loans of diﬀerentiated types, and therefore act as monopolistic price
setting ﬁrms. The decision problem then becomes more complex if one considers
that the expected return of one asset in the portfolio calculus (loans) depends on
the bank’s own decision. We neglect this problem by assuming that loans are more
or less perfect substitutes, and that we have one credit market interest rate in the
model which renders banks as price takers.
• Liability management: The bank attracts ﬁnancial resources in order to expand the
asset side. This is called scaling the balance sheet or determining its optimal volume.
Since we consider banks to be price takers, they cannot attract more deposits by
raising the deposit interest rate, which is assumed to be given and set to zero for
the sake of simplicity. Henceforth, it must take the deposit volume as given. A long
run equilibrium level of the asset volume will be reﬁnanced by long run reﬁnancing
instruments like bonds or equity capital. We do not model the calculus for issuing
bonds or shares. Instead, we assume that long run reﬁnancing instruments are on
their optimal level, but short run ﬂuctuations e.g. of deposits and reserves require a
short run adaptation to the optimal portfolio volume by changing demand for loans
on the interbank market.
• Liquidity management: Deposits and hence reserves are volatile. If unexpected
withdrawals occur, the deposit outﬂows may exceed reserves which leads to an
(il)liquidity problem. In this case the bank has to borrow short run reserves at
high penalty interest rates, otherwise it could be subject to bankrun eﬀects and
ﬁnally insolvency. In the literature it is common to model this by balancing the
costs of avoiding illiquidity with the opportunity costs of holding reserves instead
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consideration into the portfolio calculus.
• Solvency management: If losses from the risky portfolio exceed the bank’s capital,
the bank is insolvent. This risk is controlled by regulating the volume of risky
assets compared to the bank capital. Shareholders are interested in a large return
on their capital but also in a low risk of insolvency. Both goals are in conﬂict since an
expansion of the portfolio which is ﬁnanced by debt enhances both, the bank capital
return due to the leverage eﬀect, and also the risk of insolvency. Furthermore, the
relation between risky assets and banking capital is also constrained by external
regulations like Basel III. We integrate this solvency consideration into the calculus
of the liability management.
Bank ﬁrms have diﬀerent decision variables to address these management tasks. The
diﬃculty is that these tasks are interdependent. Note, for example, that excess reserves
have a double function in this framework: They are the riskless part of the portfolio (e.g.
like in the approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1988)), and they are also held to avoid
expected liquidity shortings (e.g. like in the approaches of Ag´ enor and El Aynaoui (2010)
or Nautz (1998)). The demand for borrowed reserves is also related to two management
tasks. One aim is to keep the scale of the portfolio on its optimal level. Therefore, they
are a reﬁnancing instrument. But since deposits and reserves are volatile, the need to
hold enough liquidity arises. The latter drives the money market demand. However, this
is not in contrast to the implication of the liability management task to keep the optimal
portfolio scale.
On the asset side, we will not consider loans to ﬁrms and households and bonds as
speciﬁc risky assets. We subsume them under the term “risky investments” and assume
that the internal structure of these investments is determined optimally (for details see
Georg and Pasche (2008)). We are interested in the combination of these investments
with risky interbank loans. The risk-return properties of the asset “provided interbank
loans” will diﬀer from other (non-bank) investments. Banks will typically have a lower
default rate because they have access to short run standing facilities from the central bank.
Furthermore, the banking sector is regulated to a larger extent than private ﬁrms. Thus,
interbank loans could be considered as an asset with lower risk than other investments.
Since these loans typically have a lower expected return than investments (otherwise
investments would be a strictly dominated alternative), it is rational to mix both assets
in a risky portfolio, and to mix the risky portfolio with risk-free excess reserves. At the
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side2. This is non-trivial since the ability to provide interbank loans may depend on the
ability of the bank to reﬁnance itself on the same market. The interdependency requires
some additional consistency requirements for an equilibrium analysis. The main point is
that the consistency of simultaneous supply and demand plans depends on the activity
of the central bank. We show that by determining the interest rate for main reﬁnancing
operations, the central bank also determines the excess demand in the money market.
3 A Model of Interbank Market and Demand for
Central Bank Loans
3.1 An Introductory Two-Bank Example
There are several reasons why bank A might borrow reserves to bank B. One reason might
be that interbank lending helps compensating short-run liquidity needs or to faciliate
window-dressing. Such activities would not explain the important quantitative role of
interbank lending between European banks where interbank exposures are roughly about
20-30% of the balance sheet. Another reason might be that banks are to some extent
specialized and do not hold identical asset portfolios. Interbank lending would enable
one bank to participate in other’s portfolios, i.e. to enhance diversiﬁcation eﬀects. Both
reasons point imply that interbank lending fosters the eﬃcient allocation of liquidity. The
following model shows that this diversiﬁcation eﬀect might also take place in case of banks
with the same asset structure as long as the characteristic of an interbank loan makes it
attractive to mix it with other risky investments. As argued before, interbank loans are
considered to have a lower risk than other investments.
Consider the case of two banks A and B with the following simpliﬁed balance sheets:
E + I = (1 − r)D + C (= VA = VB = V )
⇒ (1 − λR)V + λRV = V
with E as excess reserves which are assumed to have zero risk and a low interest rate
ρE, and I as a risky portfolio with expected return ρI and risk σ2
I. We have deposits D
2Of course this wouldn’t make any sense in case of risk neutrality. Note that also holding deposits at
another bank with a positive deposit interest rate has similar properties as providing a loan to the other
bank.
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both sides of the balance sheet because it is assumed that the bank is not free in their
portfolio structure decision to hold rD. Furthermore we have C as the “capital” of the
bank, including net worth and diﬀerent types of long-run reﬁnancing instruments which
are considered to be ﬁxed in our analysis. We call V the volume (or scale) of the portfolio.
The analysis starts with no interbank loans. Then λR is the optimally chosen share of the
portfolio invested into risky assets I due to the portfolio calculus.
Now consider that bank A is able to provide an interbank loan K to bank B. We denote
the expected return from K by ρK and its risk is given by σ2
K. Ceteris paribus, this implies
a restructuring of the asset side:











I )VA = VA
The optimal structure is now given by an adjusted λA
R, while the risky part of the portfolio
consists of the share λA
I of non-bank assets, and (1 − λA
I ) of interbank loans.
On the other side, bank B has extended its portfolio volume by K:
EB + IB = VB + K
(1 − λ
B
R)(VB + K) + λ
B
R(VB + K) = VB + K
where the optimal portfolio structure λB
R is not aﬀected. In the aggregated balance sheet
of the banking sector, K could be cancelled out as it is done in almost all macro models,
but obviously K has an impact on the single bank’s behavior and should therefore be
taken into consideration.
This interbank loan may be proﬁtable for both banks if the (ρK,σ2
K)-proﬁle is not domi-
nated by the (ρI,σ2
I)-proﬁle of the non-bank asset. As argued above, it could be assumed
that due to regulation and standing facilities the probabiliy of debt failure is low relative
to non-bank assets. Hence we have σ2
K < σ2
I. Then it is useful to diversiﬁcate risk by
including K. But also for bank B it might be proﬁtable to demand for an interbank loan
as long as the expected return of the portfolio exceeds the marginal reﬁnancing cost ρK.3
But due to the symmetry of both banks, the interbank loans contract could have been
made just in the opposite direction: bank B borrows reserves to bank A. Moreover, it is
3To be more precise, the marginal cost are the interest rate ρK payed for K which is lower than the
expected return E[ρK] due to the small probability of debt failure. Because this probability is assumed to
be small and since we should avoid additional notation, we take ρK as a proxy for the expetcted return.
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activities. In the latter case it is convenient to study the behavior of a representative
bank which holds K as an asset and also extends its portfolio by interbank lending. Since
we follow the traditional approach of modelling a representative agent, and since aggre-
gated bank statistics shows these exposures on both sides of the balance sheet, we have
to assume that the bank manages provided and demanded reserves at the same time.
3.2 Behavior of a Representative Bank on the Interbank Market
3.2.1 Preliminaries
As the example in the previous section shows, the bank decides about the optimal portfo-
lio structure and the optimal portfolio volume. It is well-known that only utility functions
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) allow to separate the decision about struc-
ture and volume, i.e. that the optimal portfolio shares λR are independend from V .
Unfortunately, CRRA functions lead to analytically extensive expressions for the optimal
volume and have some non-intuitive properties which seem not to be empirically reason-
able, i.e. the eﬀect that the portfolio scale will be reduced instead of expanded in case of
an increased attractiveness of the portfolio (see Georg and Pasche (2008)). We therefore
assume that structural decisions on the asset side and volume decisions on the liability
side are done by internally specialized departments of the bank. According to Krainer
(2009), there exist theoretical arguments (based on agency theory) as well as empirical
evidence which justify this assumption. He argues that structural decisions about the
asset side are made by a risk-averse portfolio manager, while decisions about the portfolio
scale are taken by a risk-neutral liability manager. We will follow this approach.
As discussed before, excess reserves have a double function as a riskless part of the portfolio
and as a liquidity device to avoid or alleviate the problem of liquidity shortings in case
of large deposit withdrawals. The latter motive, however, interferes with the portfolio
decision which is based only on risk and return: The optimal share of E from the portfolio
calculus may be suboptimal for an optimal liquidity management, and vice versa. We solve
this problem by a common assumption about the expected outﬂow of reserves which allows
to formulate the costs of avoiding illiquidity per unit of the portfolio. The expected cost
of liquidity shortage could then be integrated into the portfolio calculus.
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ﬂows
Deposits are a stochastic variable. Adopting the approach of Ag´ enor and El Aynaoui
(2010) we assume that with probability Φ there is a liquidity shock where a fraction δ of
the deposits D is withdrawn4. A withdrawal of deposits also reduces the required reserves
rD, so there is an expected liquidity shortage if δ(1−r)D exceeds E. The expected value
of reﬁnancing requirements is therefore given by Φ(δ(1−r)D −E). The expected cost of
liquidity which has to be borrowed in the short run for marginal lending rates (“penalty
rates”) is given by
ρp · (δ(1 − r)D − E)Φ (1)
We follow Totzek (2009), among others, in that the penalty interest rate is a markup on the
money market interest rate ρK which is determined by the central bank: ρp = (1+ζ)ρK.
In case of the Euro system, the penalty rate is the marginal lending facility of the ECB.
Equation (1) could also be expressed in terms of one portfolio unit by dividing by V :
ρp · (δ(1 − r)λD − (1 − λR))Φ (2)
where λD is the deposit fraction in the balance sheet (liability side), and (1 − λR) is the
fraction of excess reserves in the balance sheet (asset side). This allows to easily integrate
the costs of avoiding liquidity shortages into the portfolio calculus.
Two empirically relevant issues are not addressed in this model: (i) We assumed that
required reserves must be held by the bank. In fact, the bank has to meet the reserve
requirements only in the mean of a certain period. This is controlled at certain cutoﬀ days
which induces some demand peaks on the reserve market immediately before these days.
We assume that these eﬀects are negligible. (ii) The existence of deposit insurances makes
it less probable that a bank falls into liquidity shortage, and they reduce the probability
of bank runs (see Diamond and Dybvig (2000) on this issue).
3.2.3 Determining the optimal asset structure
The asset structure is determined by a risk-averse portfolio manager who follows a con-
ventional portfolio calculus. The structure of the risky part of the portfolio is independent
from the portfolio volume. Let ρI,σ2
I be the expected return and risk of investments I,
and ρK,σ2
K the expected return and risk of interbank loans K. Furthermore, cov is the
4See Totzek (2009) for a more elaborated approach.
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tive: When banks face a negative shock on their asset I, the bank’s ability to pay back
the interbank loan will also be aﬀected negatively. Furthermore, let ρE be the return of
the excess reserves as the riskless part of the portfolio. Expected return and variance of
the risky portfolio is then given by







I + (1 − λI)
2σ
2
K + λI(1 − λI)cov (4)
The fraction λI is determined in a way that the risky portfolio is the tangential point to
the Capital Allocation Line (CAL):








where µP,σP are the expected return and the standard deviation of the total portfolio.
Maximzing b with respect to λI gives the optimal risky portfolio structure:
λI =
(ρI − ρE)σ2
K − (ρK − ρE)cov
(ρI − ρE)σ2
K + (ρK − ρE)σ2
I − (ρI + ρK − 2ρE)cov
(5)
To determine the optimal share of the excess reserves as the riskless part of the portfolio,
we use a quadratic utility function in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
We assume that excess reserve’s interest rate ρE is set by the central bank in the same
manner as the marginal lending facility, but with a negative markup on the money market
interest rate: ρE = (1 − ζ)ρK. The central bank is therefore able to determine ρK (this
is shown in the next section) and the spread 2ζ which determines the deposit and the
marginal lending rate.
The standard portfolio calculus is now extended in order to account for the expected
costs of liquidity shortings as expressed by (2). We assume that balancing risk and return
with a given degree of risk aversion θ on the one hand, and avoiding the expected cost
of liquidity shortages on the other hand are separable. We furthermore account only for
the expected cost of liquidity shortages, not its variance in order to keep analysis simple.
Then the extended calculus for one portfolio unit reads as
max
λR







R − ρp(δ(1 − r)λD − (1 − λR))Φ
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λR =




The last term in the numerator makes the diﬀerence to the standard solution without
liquidity considerations. Intuively, a higher penalty rate makes it more attractive to care
for suﬃcient liquidity in expense of investing into a risky portfolio. But in general, the
dependency of λR on ρK is ambigous, recalling that an increasing ρK also increases µR
and reduces σ2
R (via λI), cf. equations (3) and (4).
Now all structural decisions, based on risk, return, and liquidity are completely deter-
mined: λRλI,λR(1 − λI),(1 − λR) are the shares of risky investments, interbank loans
supply, and excess reserves, respectively. It has to be noted that all shares should be
truncated to the [0,1] interval.
3.2.4 Determining the optimal portfolio volume
The risk-neutral liability manager’s task is to attract ﬁnancial funds in order to scale the
portfolio volume to its optimal level. Since we take deposits as well as long-run reﬁnancing
instruments like bank capital as given, the decision variable is the amount of interbank
loans K. As mentioned before, we implicitly assume that long-run reﬁnancing instruments
have been adjusted to an optimal level, but short-run ﬂuctuations of deposits and reserves
require an adaptation of K. Furthermore, long-run reﬁnancing instruments and K are
imperfect substitutes which justiﬁes a certain mix of both instruments.
We assume that the utility function of the liability manager is simply the expected net
proﬁt from holding the portfolio: π(K) = µRλRV +ρE(1−λR)V −ρKK. As long as µR >
ρK holds true, the liability manager would expand the portfolio volume and henceforth
the I/C ratio to inﬁnity. Thus, the choice of an optimal K is always a border solution due
to external constraints like Basel III requirements for the I/C ratio, or rationing eﬀects on
the interbank market. But empirically seen, many banks hold more capital than required
by regulation, indicating an interior solution of the liability management problem. One
of the main problems of a liability manager is that expanding the portfolio by debt and
hence enhancing the I/C ratio implies a trade oﬀ between increased returns to capital
and the probability of bank distress (see Diamond and Rajan (2000) on this issue).
The deﬁnition of expected net proﬁt given above does not include the case of insolvency.
A bank is insolvent if the losses from the portfolio exceed the bank capital. Let R be the
12
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probability of insolvency is then given by













with F(·) as the cumulative distribution function of R. We assume that in case of insol-
vency, shareholders lose their complete capital C. Including this insolvency probability,
the expected net proﬁt is now deﬁned as
π(K) = (1 − Ψ(K))[µRλRV + ρE(1 − λR)V − ρKK] − Ψ(K)C (8)
Enhancing the portfolio volume by additional loans K will therefore increase both, the







λRV 2 > 0 (9)
which implies a trade-oﬀ. In order to avoid too complicated analytical expressions, we








The marginal impact of an additional portfolio unit on the insolvency probability is a
linear decreasing function of the insolvency probability. Inserting V = (1−r)D +K +C






(λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE)((1 − r)D + C) + C




with λR according to (6). As we will see later, these demand plans are always realized when
the central bank serves the excess demand on the money market. Since ρK also aﬀects
µR,σ2
R,λR, the dependency of Kd on ρK is non-linear and non-monotonous (depending
on the parametrization): An increasing ρK makes the risky portfolio more attractive and
induces an expansion, while the reﬁnancing of this expansion becomes more expensive.
Moreover, the penalty rate as well as the deposit rate increase, so that the portfolio is
restructured in favor or in expense of reserves.
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(and henceforth V ), all behavioral functions in this model are determined. Suppressing
the extensive analytical expressions, we have:
I(ρK,·) = λRλI((1 − r)D + C + K
d)
K
s(ρK,·) = λR(1 − λI)((1 − r)D + C + K
d)
E(ρK,·) = (1 − λR)((1 − r)D + C + K
d)
where Ks are the interbank loans held as an asset, i.e. the (private) supply side of the
interbank market. Note, that the behavior which drives investment (e.g. loans to ﬁrms
and households, bonds), the supply of interbank credits, and the holding of reserves also
depend non-linearly and eventually non-monotonously on ρK, although the underlying
calculus is quite simple. As mentioned before, this results from the complex interdepen-
dencies of portfolio, liquidity, and liability considerations. Since the structural variables
λR,λI are truncated to the [0,1] interval, it is also likely that the behavioral functions may
have kinks.The eﬀect of ρK, as the central bank’s operating target, on I,K,E depends
on the parametrization, i.e. the underlying data generating economic process.
3.2.5 Consistency Condition and Derivation of Central Bank Loans Demand
The motives to provide Ks and to demand Kd are diﬀerent, and for a single bank sup-
ply and demand for interbank loans will diﬀer for a given ρK. The consistency of plans,
however, is a matter of the aggregated sector. In a closed bank sector there is an equi-
librium when Kd(ρK) = Ks(ρK). For ρK = 0 it is unattractive to hold K as an asset
but more attractive to expand the portfolio, so that Kd(0) > Ks(0). If ρK increases to
a critical value where it becomes completely unattractive to reﬁnance the portfolio by
interbank loans, we have Ks > Kd = 0. From this fact and the continuity of Kd,Ks
in ρK, we can conclude that there is (at least) one ρ∗
K which equilibrates supply and
demand: Ks(ρ∗
K) = Kd(ρ∗
K). The interbank loans market is, however, a ﬁnancial market
which should be characterized by information asymmetries. Henceforth, it is reasonable
to assume non-market clearing interest rates and rationing eﬀects (see Freixas and Jorge
(2008)). With the assumption that banks have more or less similar management policies
and that they demand interbank loans primarly for short-run liquidity reasons and not to
ﬁnance projects with private information about the project type, we regard these agency
problems to be negligible.
Now consider that the central bank is an additional player on the interbank market by
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loans as perfect substitutes to interbank loans. In reality, however, both loan types may
diﬀer due to collateral requirements, diﬀerent maturities, and simply by the timing of
tender procedures. Since we treat loans as perfect substitutes, there is only one interest
rate ρK. The equilibrium condition is now modiﬁed to Kd(ρK) = Ks(ρK)+Kc where Kc
is the central bank loans supply. The central bank is now able to set an interest rate ρK
which induces an excess (or residual) demand Kd(ρK)−Ks(ρK) = Kc > 0. It is assumed
that this excess demand is satisﬁed by central bank loans, i.e. there is full allotment and





This allows the central bank to set the interest rate ρK as an operating target and there-
fore to induce a residual demand for borrowed reserves Kc(ρK). The latter is hence
microfounded by portfolio, liquidity and liability management decisions of a representa-
tive bank. If the central bank follows an interest rate rule, it must respond to shifts in
Kd and Ks by accomodating the excess demand for borrowed reserves. The money base
is therefore endogenously determined (cf. Georg and Pasche (2008)).
The previously described way of supplying the banking sector with borrowed liquidity is
more close to the practice of the ECB rather than the Fed. If there is an excess demand
for reserves and the central bank aims to keep the money market interest rate on the
current level, it is also possible to supply liquidity by purchasing bonds which are a part
of I in our model. In this case we have a structural change of the asset side in favor
of reserves (−∆I = +∆E), but no extension of the balance sheet’s scale. This way of
expanding the monetary base by purchasing bonds is more typical for the practice of the
Fed. Purchasing bonds and paying with reserves immediately aﬀects the reserve demand
Kd on the money market so that the targeted interest rate equals the equilibrium rate. In
equilibrium, this operation is only possible if the bank is willing to sell bonds to the Fed,
i.e. to restructure its asset side. This implies higher bonds prices and a lower interest rate
ρI. Since the purpose of this paper is an outline of a model of bank behavior especially
on the interbank market and to derive the central bank loans demand, we will not study
the implications of these diﬀerent central bank policy strategies.
There are two further consistency conditions which must hold true in a closed model of
the ﬁnancial sector: (a) A bank will demand additional central bank loans ∆Kc in order
to reﬁnance its asset side. For a single bank there is no need that the additional loans are
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ments. For the aggregated banking sector, however, ∆Kc = ∆E holds true as a matter of
accounting record. This is because the central bank’s balance sheet reads S+Kc = rD+E
(with S as securities) and D is assumed to be given. A model of the complete ﬁnancial
sector would require that equilibrium interest rates adjust so that for the representative
bank ∆Kc = ∆E holds true in terms of planned values. (b) Observe, that I includes loans
to ﬁrms and households (besides bonds and other securities). Additional loans, however,
create additional deposits by accounting record: ∆I = ∆D. These additional deposits
are typically not held by the borrower at the bank which has provided the loan, but nec-
cessarily at some bank in the banking sector. Therefore, a single bank’s microeconomic
calculus does not care about these both consistency conditions, but they are neccessary
when plugging the model of bank behavior into a macro model of the aggregated ﬁnancial
sector.
3.2.6 The transmission of ρK to ρI
Up to now, our model consists of several exogenously given parameters, i.e. the return
of risky investments ρI. These investments are mainly loans to non-banks like ﬁrms and
households, and bonds. A change of the reﬁnancing conditions ρK aﬀects the desired
supply of ﬁnancial ressources I(ρI,ρK,·). We will now replace the assumption of an
exogenously given ρI. We have to consider that a shift of I(ρI,ρK,·), together with a given
downward sloping demand curve for ﬁnancing investments Id(ρI,·) will induce a shift of
the equilibrium interest rate ρ∗
I which is now an endogeneous variable. We consider ρ∗
I as
the market clearing interest rate, neglecting rationing eﬀects which are typical, however,
for ﬁnancial makets with information asymmetries. Since this is the interest rate which
explains the level of investments, it is the most important link between the monetary
and the real sphere, and henceforth of the transmission process of monetary policy. To
account for this eﬀect, we assume a simple linear decreasing demand function
I
d(ρI) = a − bρI
With the condition I(ρ∗
I,ρK) = λRλI((1−r)D +C +Kd) = a−bρ∗
I = Id(ρ∗
I) we have the
equilibrium interest rate ρ∗
I(ρK) as a positive implicit function of ρK. Since the analyt-
ical expression of I(ρI,ρK) is very complicated, ﬁgure 1 shows a graphical derivation of
ρ∗
I(ρK) (parameter values are given in the next section). A given value of ρK parametrizes
I(ρI,ρK) in the upper left graphic which gives – together with the demand Id – the equi-
librium interest rate ρ∗
I. The latter parametrizes the corresponding investment function in
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I(ρK))
which is depicted in the lower right quadrant. It turns out that the relationship ρ∗
I(ρK)
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Figure 1: The impact of ρK on ρI via the market for I
3.3 A Numerical Example
Even if the basic calculus of the banking ﬁrm is simple, the resulting optimal structural
and volume decisions are not. The resulting functions could be analytically derived but
are too complicated to conduct an analytical comparative-static analysis. For a numerical
example, we consider a = 2000,b = 15000 for the linear investment demand. The other
parameters are given by σI = 0.12,σK = 0.08,cov = 0,ζ = 0.5,Φ = 0.05,δ = 0.1,r =
0.02,γ = 3000. The risk aversion parameter is θ = 8. On the liability side we have
D = 800 and C = 20. It is also possible to choose D and C on a complete diﬀerent scale,
but then also γ should be adapted to these values.
Figure 2 shows the dependency of µR,1 − λI,λR, as well as the behavioral functions
determining I, E and Ks,Kd on ρK. As long as we have σK < σI and a zero covariance,
an increase of 1−λI leads to a monotone decrease of σR which is therefore not depicted. For
each ρK we have computed the equilibrium interest rate ρ∗
I on the market for investment
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 070funds, as depicted in the center quadrant (“transmission”). The demand for central bank
loans Kc is shown in the right mid ﬁgure. The volume and composition of the asset side
is depicted on the lower right side. The regions betwween the three curves depict the
excess reserves E, investments I, and interbank loans Ks (from bottom to top). Note,
that all graphs have no meaning for values ρK > ρ∗
K because the central bank is able
to set ρK < ρ∗
K to induce a positive residual demand. Otherwise the interbank market
would equilibrate without intervention of the central bank. For these values of ρK the
functions are depicted as dotted lines to indicate that they do not represent equilibrium
behavior. Note that the comparative-static analysis does not include feedbacks from the
other agents, i.e. households and ﬁrms.
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Figure 2: Eﬀects of ρK on bank behavior
Starting with extreme low values, with increasing ρK the interbank loans become more
attractive relative to non-bank investments which has an unambigous eﬀect on 1 − λI.
The expected return from the risky portfolio µR will initially decrease because it is the
variance reducing eﬀect which makes interbank loans more attractive so that the bank is
willing to restructure the portfolio in favor of K although K has a lower return than I.
The same reasoning holds true for the increase of λR. The share of the risky portfolio
will approach to 1, implying that there is no systematic excess reserve holding anymore.
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upwards due to the increase of the attractiveness of the risky portfolio. The attractiveness
is also fosetered by an increasing share λR. But then the eﬀect of a decreasing Kd and
henceforth V overcompensates the former eﬀect, and Ks becomes downward sloping. As
a result, we have a decreasing demand curve for central bank loans Kc. The lower right
quadrant summarizes all eﬀects: The total scale of the portfolio decreases with ρK and
we have a substantial change in its structure: With an increasing ρK we have a shift from
risk-free to risky assets, and a shift from investments to interbank loans.
4 Eﬀects of exogenous shocks
In the following, we take the same parameter set as in ﬁgure 2 and change one variable
to study the comparative-static eﬀects on bank behavior. In all ﬁgures the solid lines
represent the situation before the parameter change, and the dotted lines show the eﬀect
of the shock. For a proper interpretation it has to be underlined that all lines represent
the equilibrium behavior of the bank only up to the equilibrium interest rate ρ∗
K where
Ks and Kd intersect (the upper right quadrant). On the right side of the equilibrium
point (ρK > ρ∗
K) all depicted lines could be computed, but they are meaningless since
these notional plans could not be realized.
We ﬁrst analyse the eﬀect of a changing soundness of banking ﬁrms subjectively perceived
by the banks. A lower soundness means that banks expect a higher probability of debt
failure, expressed in a larger volatility of returns from interbank credits σ2
K. If banks
trust less to each other, the attractiveness of holding interbank loans as an asset will
decline. As can seen in ﬁgure 3, an increased σK from 0.08 to 0.11 dampens the supply of
loans Ks signiﬁcantly, but not the demand Kd which implies a shift of the central bank
loans demand Kc. Intuitively, the share 1 − λI as well as the share λR are reduced since
interbank loans became less attractive. But both eﬀects have a countervailing impact
on the absolute supply of investment funds: The resulting investment supply is virtually
unaﬀected by this shock. The reduction of Ks corresponds to an increase of the risk-free
excess reserves. Since the liability manager is assumed to be risk-neutral, the shock has
no impact on the total portfolio scale but only on the portfolio structure as can been seen
in the lower right quadrant. Also the transmission of ρK to ρI (center quadrant) remains
unaﬀected.
Now consider a risk shock on the market for investments: The standard deviation σI
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of changing σK
increases from 0.12 to 0.14. Figure 4 shows that we have reversed eﬀects compred to the
case of a σK shock: There is no eﬀect on interbank market activities. The reason is that
the reduced attractiveness of investments reduces λR and increases 1 − λI. The resulting
eﬀect on interbank loan supply is therefore zero. The total portfolio volume is unaﬀected
by the shock, but we have a restructured portfolio in favor of excess reserves. Due to the
reduced supply of ﬁnancial funds I, we have larger equilibrium interest rates ρ∗
I which
implies a shift of the transmission relation in the center quadrant.
If we combine both negative shocks (σK,σI) as they have been typical for the 2007-
2009 ﬁnancial crisis, and assuming an accompanying monetary policy which reduces ρK,
the bank behavior in this model replicates the stylized facts: Interbank borrowing is
signiﬁcantly reduced, central bank borrowing is expanded, excess reserves are massively
increased, and the eﬀect on investments is small and ambigous since the reduced ρK
compensates the reduction of the supply I.
Now consider the case of a deposit volatility change (see ﬁgure 5). This could be repre-
sented by a higher probability of a liquidity shock Φ. We assume an increase of Φ from
0.05 to 0.15. Intuitively, we observe a slight reduction of λR and an expansion of excess
reserves at the expense of investments.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of changing σI
Finally, we study the impact of a risk aversion decrease as it may take place in boom phases
(see ﬁgure 6). We assume a shift of θ from 8 to 6. As the decision about the portfolio
scale depends on a risk-neutral expected proﬁt function, the risk aversion parameter has
no direct eﬀect on Kd and the portfolio volume. The very small changes are explained by
indirect eﬀects of an increased λR. The structural eﬀects are straightforward: We observe
an increase of λR which results in reduction of excess reserves in favor of the risky assets
I and Ks. An almost unchanged Kd and an increased Ks implies a reduction of central
bank loans.
The central bank is not only able to determine its operating target ρK. Independently
from this target, it could also change the marginal lending and the deposit facility. In
our model, this is done by adapting the spread 2ζ (ζ moves from 0.5 to 0.7). Figure 7
shows the results. Since the penalty rate in case of liquidity shorting is larger, excess
reserves become more attractive. On the other hand, the deposit facility rate is lower
which makes excess reserve holding less attractive. In our numerical example the latter
eﬀect dominates. The portfolio is slightly restructured in favor of both risky assets.
Now consider a negative shock on the investment demand side: We have a shift of the
demand function (a changes from 3000 to 2700). The eﬀects, as depicted in ﬁgure 8, are
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of an increased deposit volatility
very similar to the case of an increase of σI. Investments become less attractive. Since we
have also a reduced λR and a reduced portfolio scale, the impact on Kd and the excess
reserves is ambigous: The risky part of the portfolio is slightly restructured in favor of
Ks but at the same time the portfolio volume is signiﬁcantly reduced. The latter eﬀect
dominates so that Ks decreases. The former eﬀect dominates for the excess reserves so
that we observe a very small increase of E. Since interbank loan demand is reduced
stronger than interbank supply, the resulting central bank loans demand also decreases.
Note that other parametrizations may lead to other net eﬀects.
Since the risk-free reserves are nearly unaﬀected while the risky investments are reduced,
the capital/investment ratio increases with a lower investment demand. This implies
that the capital/investment ratio is countercyclical as it is empirically the case (Meh and
Moran (2004)).
5 Concluding Remarks
The model derives the demand and supply behavior for interbank loans from a simple
utility maximization calculus of a bank with portfolio, liquidity and liability management.
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of decreased risk aversion
The logic behind this behavior is that on the one hand banks hold interbank loans as an
asset in an optimally structured portfolio, and on the other hand they reﬁnance their
portfolio by demanding borrowed reserves. Thus, the supply of loans depends on whether
the reﬁnancing demand is realized, which makes the behavior slightly complicated and
implies a non-linear dependency on ρK on both market sides. As the central bank also
provides borrowed reserves, it is possible to determine the money market interest rate
(as its operating target) and to induce a demand for central bank loans. The model
allows to study the impact of monetary policy on the structure and the scale of the
bank’s portfolio. This is important because both issues determine the supply of ﬁnancial
ressouces to investors and therefore the interest rate on credit and bonds markets. The
behavior of the bank is hence a complex hinge between monetary measures and the real
part of the economy.
On the banking side, we have neglected several important issues which may be included
into an extended analysis: (a) One important task of the bank is the management of
diﬀerent maturities of assets and liabilities. This would require a dynamic framework.
Since investment contracts like loans have a long maturity, the interest rate could not
be adapted immediately to a perceived shock. Hence, the calculus has to consider the
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Figure 7: Eﬀects of a decreased spread 2ζ
possibility of future changes in variables as in the approaches of H¨ ulsewig et al. (2009) on
staggered interest rate setting or Nautz (1998) on intertemporal reserve management. (b)
We have neglected information asymmetries and agency costs. A simple way to account
for this issue would be to endogenize the risk as a positive function of the interest rate as in
the standard literature based on Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). (c) We neglect some technical
details of central bank lending and interbank lending: loans may require collaterals like
speciﬁc types of bonds on the asset side, and the interest rate may be determined by the
debt/equity ratio as a proxy for the individual risk of debt failure. This would impose
additional constraints for both, the structural portfolio decisions and the decision about
the portfolio scale. Furthermore, the central bank is able to cut the allotments of loans
(rationing). (d) As pointed out in Pasche (2009), it is possible to account for fundamental
uncertainty, which may play an important role especially in times of a ﬁnancial crisis.
Increasing fundamental uncertainty could shift the behavior in favor of holding liquidity.
(e) There is no calculus determining the long-run reﬁnancing instruments like equity
capital or issued bonds which are an imperfect substitute to borrowed reserves Kd.
Although we employed a simple mechanism to determine the interest rate ρI on the in-
vestment market by introducing a linear demand function and assuming market clearing,
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Figure 8: Eﬀects of a reduced investment demand
the model is neither a complete model of ﬁnancial markets, nor a full-ﬂedged macroeco-
nomic model. In a complete model, we would have several feedback mechanisms: While
the interest rate ρI and the allocated ﬁnancial ressources I have an impact on the real
sector of the economy, i.e. on the income y, the real sector determines the demand for
ﬁnancial ressources Id as well as the demand for money, which is represented as deposits
D. According to common macroeconomic theorizing, the money demand is endogenously
determined by income and interest rates: D(y,ρI). It has to be underlined that we do
not argue on the basis of a mechanistic money multiplier. The relationship between the
money base rD + E (as the liability side of the central bank’s balance sheet) and D is
determined by bank and non-bank behavior in a complex way (see e.g. Alves et al. (2008)
for an attempt to study the multiplier process with actively managed interrelated banking
ﬁrms).
We hope that this more rigorously microfounded and rich-structured model of banking
behavior helps to improve macroeconomic models in order to understand the transmission
process of monetary policy. As we have seen, the translation of ρK to ρI and I is non-
trivial due to non-linearities and non-monotonies, and it depends on several parameters.
When designing an optimal monetary policy (rule) it has to be taken into account that
25
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behavior.
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First order condition of maximizing (8) gives
dπ
dK
= −Φ′(K)[(λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE)((1 − r)D + C + K) − ρKK + C]
+ (1 − Φ(K))[λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE − ρK] = 0
Using the assumption (1 − Φ)/Φ′ = γ gives
⇒ − [(λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE)((1 − r)D + C + K) − ρKK + C]
+ γ[λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE − ρK] = 0
Solving for K gives
Kd = γ −
(λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE)((1 − r)D + C) + C
λRµR + (1 − λR)ρE − ρK
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